ABSTRACT Malware classification plays an important role in tracing the attack sources of computer security. However, existing static analysis methods are fast in classification, but they are inefficient in some malware using packing and obfuscation techniques; the dynamic analysis methods have better universality for packing and obfuscation, but they will cause excessive classification cost. To overcome these shortcomings, in this paper, we propose a classification system Malscore based on the probability scoring and machine learning, which sets the probability threshold to concatenate static analysis (called Phase 1) and dynamic analysis (called Phase 2). The convolutional neural networks with spatial pyramid pooling were used to analyze the grayscale images (static features) in Phase 1, and the variable n-grams and machine learning were used to analyze the native API call sequences (dynamic features) in Phase 2. Malscore combined static analysis with dynamic analysis not only accelerated the static analysis process by taking advantage of the CNN in image recognition but also appeared to be more resilient to obfuscation by the dynamic analysis. Different from other static and dynamic analysis techniques, when malware is detected, due to the fact that malware will most likely be labeled only by static analysis, we could reduce the overheads by dynamically analyzing a few malware that has less obvious features or greater confusion in static analysis. We performed experiments on 174 607 malware samples from 63 malware families. The result showed that Malscore achieved 98.82% accuracy for malware classification. Furthermore, Malscore was compared with the method of using static and dynamic analysis. The preprocessing and test time represented a reduction of 59.58% and 61.70%, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of various automated tools has shown that the speed with which malware mutates on the Internet is far faster than people realized. Kaspersky Labs detected 15,714,700 malicious objects in 2017 [1] , while the number of malicious files detected by McAfee Labs increased to 79 million per day in 2018 Q1 (Q1 means the first quartal), up from 45 million in 2017 Q4 (Q4 means the fourth quartal) [2] . Although the speed with which malware mutates on the Internet is getting faster and faster, most unknown malware is derived from known malware. Therefore, finding the homology among samples plays an important role in tracing attack sources, restoring operating environments, and preventing attacks.
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Most malware can be classified by analyzing static features, but the proliferation of the packing and obfuscation techniques easily facilitates the creation of malware with consistent behavior and inconsistent static features. Dynamic analysis is required for such malware. Although dynamic analysis is very effective in behavioral analysis, it also means more cost than static analysis [3] . Thus, it is necessary to find an effective combination scheme to solve these problems. That is, static analysis can be used to classify most malware, and dynamic analysis can be fully utilized to analyze the behavior of the malware.
In this work, we propose a malware classification system Malscore based on probability scoring and machine learning. We first generate grayscale images from raw malware as static features and extract native API call sequences by executing malware in the sandbox as dynamic features. Grayscale images can reflect the overall outline and VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ static structure of malware, and have been demonstrated to be an effective static feature [4] . API call sequences with rich semantics and not easily changed with obfuscation techniques are the most commonly used dynamic features for mining malware behavior. Then, we train the classifier S and the classifier D using grayscale images and native API call sequences, respectively. The classifier S is based on Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) with Spatial Pyramid Pooling (SPP) [5] , and the classifier D is based on variable n−grams(n = 2, 3, 4) and machine learning.
To concatenate the classifier S and the classifier D, this paper proposes a kind of probability scoring with probability threshold (PT). We set the output of the softmax layer in the classifier S as the probability value vector, and judge the credibility of the classification result by comparing the probability value vector of each malware sample with PT.
The classifier D will further analyze malware with lower credibility. Malscore mainly utilizes the detection speed and low cost of static analysis, and the better robustness of dynamic analysis for packed/obfuscated malware. Packing/ obfuscation malware will get a probability value vector after it is analyzed by the classifier S. Such malware is dispersed and will not be absolutely similar to any family. But such malware can easily be filtered out and entered into classifier D. In this way, Malscore improves the robustness for packed/obfuscated malware, and thus improves the classification accuracy. Because of the high-cost of dynamic analysis, if all malware samples are input into classifier D, this will greatly increase the detection cost. We use probability scoring to filter out most malware that get reliable classification results in classifier S, and only input unreliable malware into classifier D. Through this method, the execution times of dynamic analysis is reduced, and the detection cost of Malscore is reduced.
The contributions of this paper are four-fold: 1) We take grayscale images as static features and classify malware using CNN with SPP layer. Thus, Malscore can reduce the information loss of malware caused by the image preprocessing. 2) We use variable n-grams as dynamic features and apply DF.IDF to select meaningful features. Thus, Malscore can support association between features so that the semantic information in the malware is retained as much as possible. 3) We propose a probability scoring to concatenate static analysis and dynamic analysis, which can improve the classification accuracy of Malscore and reduce the classification cost of dynamic analysis in Malscore.
4) We perform a series of evaluation experiments for
Malscore on a real and large malware data set. The results show that Malscore has higher accuracy and lower classification cost. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II surveys the key research content of the related work. Section III describes the system framework of Malscore. Sections IV and V explain the process that grayscale images are analyzed by using CNN with SPP, and native API call sequences are analyzed by using variable n-grams and machine learning. The experimental and results are presented in Section VI. Section VII describes the limitations of our paper. Finally, Section VIII summarizes this paper and proposes future work.
II. RELATED WORK A. MALWARE CLASSIFICATION USING STATIC ANALYSIS AND VISUALIZED IMAGES
In static analysis, the visualized images are extracted from the raw executable file, which represents the overall feature of malware [3] , [4] , [6] - [15] . Nataraj et al. [4] were the first to classify malware families by visualizing malware binary files as grayscale images and using similarity calculations between images. The authors perform experiments on 9,458 samples representing 25 malware families and reach a classification accuracy of 98%. A number of researchers extend the method proposed by Nataraj by using multiple classification methods [3] , [6] , [7] , including machine learning models, to test multiple malware corpora containing more than 100,000 malware samples. Unlike Nataraj, Han et al. [8] propose a weighted, synthetic, multi-segmented texture fingerprint similarity matching method to detect malicious code variants and unknown malicious code. When this method classify six malicious code families, its highest accuracy can reach 85.77%. Hanbing et al. [9] propose a Pairwise rotation invariant co-occurrence local binary pattern feature for analyzing the grayscale image generated from binary file. This method has a good effect in solving code obfuscation. Liu et al. [10] and Makandar and Patrot [11] use K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) and wavelet transform to process grayscale images generated from malware, respectively. And the accuracy of these malware classification approach can reach 98.2% and 98.88%, respectively. Furthermore, given the stirring of interest in deep learning in recent years, an increasing number of researchers propose using deep learning methods to classify malware using visualized images [12] - [15] . Tobiyama et al. [14] were the first to extract features from a trained recurrent neural network (RNN) and generate feature images. Then, feature images with labels were assembled to form the input to the CNN. The system classify 26 types of malware from 11 families. This method can reach a classification accuracy of 96%. In addition to extracting features from the raw malware, there are also other methods that extract higher-level features to detect malware. For example, MaMaDroid modele behavior as abstract API call sequences and transform them into Markov chains [16] . DroidSieve build features model from lightweight code and resource parsing for obfuscated malware detection and classification [17] . And data streams from sensitive resources are also proved to be an effective method for detecting malware [18] . 
B. MALWARE CLASSIFICATION USING DYNAMIC ANALYSIS AND API CALLS
As background to the method proposed in this paper, this section introduces some malware classification work using API calls by dynamically executing malware. Ki et al. [19] extract common malicious API call sequence model from different kinds of malware using DNA sequence alignment algorithms. The model divide 26 different types of API calls with a standard of API call functions. Their work achieve a recall of 99.8%. Pektaş et al. [20] also modele API calls with a standard of API call functions. They focus on mining meaningful behavioral features from the API call sequence, and use the TFIDF of each n-grams as the weight of each feature. This method can reach a classification accuracy of 98%. Lee et al. [21] collect API call sequences through the Cuckoo sandbox, then convert API calls into same type of code, and finally detect malware using n-grams and clustering coefficients. Comparing the similarity of malware take 0.0097s on a server with a 2.5GHz CPU in this method. Natani and Vidyarthi et al. [22] use API function frequencies as feature vectors and classify malware using classifier with ensemble learning. This method has a good classification performance in a data set with 200 malware samples. Kolosnjaji et al. [23] were the first to analyze API sequences using deep learning, which process dynamically API call sequences by using a neural network with convolutional and recurrent layers. From a dataset that included 10 malware families, this method can reach a classification accuracy of 89.4%. In addition to directly using API sequences as features, there are also other features model applied to dynamic analysis. For example, L. Onwuzurike et al. model dynamically acquired API sequences as Markov chains [24] . Afonso et al. [25] develop a system to monitor malware dynamically. The system detects malicious behavior of mobile applications by monitoring API function calls and system calls. DroidScribe [26] uses Support Vector Machines with Conformal Prediction to process sparse data to complete malware detection. It uses system calls and OS objects as malware features. In addition, system call sequences in dynamic analysis can also be affected by obfuscation technologies. Droidcat is a method to solve the obfuscation problem of system calls in dynamic analysis by using method calls and inter-component communication Intents [27] , [28] .
C. MALWARE CLASSIFICATION INTEGRATING STATIC ANALYSIS AND DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
Han et al. [29] propose a malware visualization method based on static and dynamic analysis in which RGB images are first generated from opcode sequences extracted from malware samples. Then, key blocks are selected to extract opcode sequences using a method that dynamically executes malware. The method calculates image similarity using pixel color information from RGB images. This method can reach a classification accuracy of 98.96%. Shijo and Salim et al. [30] use printable string information extracted from malware as static feature and API call sequence extracted from Cuckoo sandbox as dynamic feature. These extracted features are then converted into binary vectors, which are assembled to form the input to two machine learning algorithms, Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Random Forest (RF). Their work can reach a classification accuracy of 98.71% in the SVM algorithm and 97.68% in the RF algorithm. Kilgallon et al. [31] extract four static features and one dynamic feature. Static features include binary features, PE input features, string features, and PE metadata features that are processed by hash functions and combine into a fixed-dimension vector. Dynamic feature is Windows API system calls. Finally they assemble these features to form the input to the machine learning for classification. This method's best accuracy can reach 85.77%. StormDroid [32] presents a combined set of contributed features for machine learning classifiers, compared with the traditional combination of static and dynamic features. At the same time, StormDroid proposes a detection method based on Streaminglized Machine Learning, which uses the concept of flow to solve the problem of large-scale data analysis.
III. SYSTEM FRAMEWORK
System framework of Malscore is shown in Figure 1, In Malscore, we used probability scoring to decide whether to perform dynamic analysis or not, instead of directly using entropy-based detection method [33] . This is because the method based on entropy can only detect whether malware is packed or not, and cannot detect whether malware uses dead code insertion, code transposition, subroutine reorder and other technologies that can avoid static analysis. In addition, there are still some problems in malware, such as less obvious static features and smaller packed/encryption blocks which do not affect the distribution of static features. Such malware need dynamic analysis to further judge and give more accurate classification result. So Malscore didn't directly divide samples of static analysis and dynamic analysis, but evaluated the reliability of malware in static analysis by probability scoring to decide whether to use dynamic analysis or not.
IV. ANALYSIS OF GRAYSCALE IMAGES USING CNN WITH SPP A. GENERATION OF GRAYSCALE IMAGES
Inspired by Nataraj et al. [4] , it is an effective static analysis method to convert malware into grayscale images. Figure 2 shows the process of converting malware into grayscale images, which requires the following steps:
1) The executable file is treated as an original binary stream. 2) Splitting the binary stream with every 8-bits and converting each 8-bits to 256-level gray value. The conversion scheme maps byte values from 0 (black) to 255 (white). 3) Gray values are converted into a two-dimensional grayscale matrix in an orderly manner. The width and height of the matrix are determined based on the size of the malware file [4] to obtain grayscale images. According to the scheme of Figure 2 , grayscale images with different sizes were generated. But the last fullyconnected layer of the CNN requires that the input feature maps be the same size, the general CNN network structure needs to preprocess the image to unify the image size. The existing processing methods segment the grayscale images [10] - [13] . However, these methods not only complicate the preprocessing of malware, but also reduce the correlation between image blocks and the effective information of images. To solve this problem, this paper constructed CNN based on VGGNet-16 [34] and SPP [5] , which was named M-CNN.
B. CONSTRUCTION OF M-CNN
Considering that the size of malware may be less than 1 KB (for example, the size of Backdoor.Win32.Agent.amjd is only 640 B, which was converted into a grayscale image of 32 × 20.), M-CNN used smaller convolution filters in deeper parts of the network. As shown in Figure 3 , the M-CNN has an input layer, 13 convolutional layers, 5 pooling layers, 3 full-connection layers, and an output layer. All the convolutional layers use a 3 × 3 convolution kernel with a step size of 1. Because the size of the feature map does not change when the feature map passes through a convolutional layer, a 1-pixel edge fill is performed on each input feature map in the convolution layer. The first four pooling layers use max pooling with a 2 × 2 sliding window and a step size of 2. The last pooling layer uses SPP instead of max pooling. The output of the SPP layer is a k × B dimension vector, where B represents the number of bins and k represents the number of filters in the last convolution layer. This fixed-dimensional vector forms the input to the fully-connected layer, allowing the inputs to be images of any size. From Figures 3 and 4 , Malscore uses 3-layer pyramid pooling and obtains vectors of 4 × 4 × 512, 2 × 2 × 512, and 1 × 1 × 512 dimensions. Then, the output of SPP is connected to a 21 × 512 dimensional vector and output to the fully connected layer.
To prevent network overfitting, the M-CNN included a dropout regularization layer with a probability of 0.5 after each pair of convolutional and pooling layers. In addition, to enhance the convergence performance of the M-CNN network, Malscore used the Leaky ReLU activation function [35] , a uniformly distributed weight initialization and batch normalization [36] .
To get the probability value vector of each malware sample, the output layer uses the softmax function. The classification result of the softmax is expressed by probability, which increases the interpretability of classification. We used equation (1) to calculate the probability that sample x belongs to family k:
Whereby, z k is the input vector of softmax. According to equation (1), a probability value vector pvv can be calculated for each malware sample x:
When max(P(y = k|x)) is greater than or equal to PT, we consider that sample x must belong to family k; otherwise, sample x does not necessarily belong to family k. Further analysis using classifier D for sample x is needed to determine the family to which the sample x belongs.
V. ANALYSIS OF NATIVE API CALL SEQUENCES USING VARIABLE N-GRAMS AND MACHINE LEARNING
For the grayscale images generated in Section IV-A, there may be some samples of the same family whose static features are not very obvious. The classifier S may obtain classification results with low credibility for such malware. sequences by executing malware in the Cuckoo sandbox [37] . Figure 5 shows the process of feature processing.
A. EXTRACTION OF VARIABLE N-GRAMS FEATURES
N-grams are a language model that enables computers to automatically classify text [38] . In this paper, n-grams were short sequences including n native API calls. In the past research work of researchers, 3−gram is the most widely used and n−gram(n > 4) is less used. When n ≥ 5, the greater the value of n, the greater the proportion of accuracy reduction and the more the number of parameters. The accuracy of n−gram(n ≥ 5) in many machine learning algorithms is 5% -26% lower than that of n < 5 [10] . As long as there is enough training set theoretically, the greater the value of n, the higher the performance. In this way, the next word will have more constraints and n−gram will have greater discrimination. But the actual situation is that the training set is very limited, which is easy to generate sparse data which does not satisfy the law of large numbers [38] . Meanwhile, if n is great, the parameter space will be too large to cause dimension disaster, so it will not be practical. On the contrary, the smaller the value of n, the more times n−gram appears in the training set, which brings more reliable statistical information and higher practicability.
Therefore, Malscore made up n-grams with lengths n = 2, 3, 4 for mining some meaningful native API calls. We found that native API call sequences of some samples have one native API call or native API call subsequence that was called continuously, which may cause information redundancy. There were also some continuous native API calls (subsequences) that are truly important features of the malware family. According to our research experience, we set a threshold of 80%. When 80% of the malware samples in a certain malware family included the same continuous native API calls (subsequences), we identified them as salient features. Thus, we needed to preprocess the native API call sequence before extracting n-grams feature, and deleted the continuous native API call or native API call subsequence existing in a few samples of the same family. The process of preprocessing is described as in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Preprocessing of Native API Call Sequences
Require: APISequence = Raw native API call sequence for each malware sample; Ensure: NewAPISequence = Preprocessed native API call sequence; 1: for family in dataset do 2: for sample in family do 3: Traversal APISequence, APIConcall ← one native API call or native API call subsequences that are called 4 times or more continuously 4: for APIConcall do 5: for sample1 in family except sample do 6: Traversal APISequence, if APIConcall exist, N ← N + 1 7: end for 8: if N > 80% of the number of samples in family then 9: Do not process APIConcall 10: else 11: Delete repetitive native API calls in APIConcall in the family 12: end if 13: end for 14: end for 15: end for
We extracted the n-grams features from the NewAPISequence with the length of n = 2, 3, 4. Figure 6 shows the extraction process of n-grams features. The sequence on the left represents the partial native API call sequence extracted from malware, and the short sequences on the right represents extracted 2−grams, 3−grams, and 4−grams features.
B. SELECTION OF VARIABLE N-GRAMS FEATURES
Most n-grams may not be meaningful for the malware classification. We selected some common n-grams features in the family training classifier D, which appear less frequently in other families. Malscore proposes Document FrequencyInverse Document Frequency (DF · IDF) to process the selection of n-grams features. DF was used to select features that are common to each family, and then IDF was used to select features that appear less frequently in other families. The DF · IDF of n-grams feature is calculated by equation (3)- (5):
Whereby, DF(i, j, k) represents the document frequency of the API call sequence j containing n-gram i in family k; {j :
Whereby, IDF(i, j, k) represents the inverse document frequency of the API call sequence j containing n-gram i in the data set; D − D(k) represents the total number of API call sequences in the data set (excluding family k); {j :
} is the number of API call sequences containing ngram i in the data set (excluding family k).
Whereby, DF · IDF(i, j, k) represents the DF · IDF of n-gram i in the malware family k, and i belongs to j.
Based on the DF · IDF of each n-grams feature, we can assess the importance of each n-grams feature. Malscore selected the top t n-grams features in each malware family according to the descending order of DF · IDF. Finally, 63 × t n-grams features were selected as the input of classifier D. The Term Frequency (TF) of each n-grams feature was selected as the feature weight. It can be calculated as:
Whereby, TF(i, j) represents the frequency of n-gram i in the API call sequence j, and n(i, j) is the number of times that i appears in j.
For example, we extracted 1,923,460 and 1,375,083 API short sequences (n−grams) from the Backdoor.Win32.Agent (3561 samples) and Trojan.Win32.Monder (1341 samples), respectively. We selected part of n−grams to illustrate the extraction process of API short sequence of malware. Table 1 shows three API short sequence features in each family. From Table 1 , the more samples containing n−grams in the family, the greater the DF value. The more samples containing n−grams outside the family, the smaller the IDF value. Interestingly, both Backdoor.Win32.Agent and Trojan.Win32.Monder contain the API short sequence ''NtAllocate VirtualMemory > NtRequestWaitReplyPort > NtQuery Attributes File'', but this short sequence is only a feature of Trojan.Win32.Monder, not of Backdoor.Win32.Agent. 
C. SELECTION OF MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS
We train the machine learning algorithm to obtain the classifier D by using the n-grams feature vectors with known tags. Classifier D can detect the family of malware from unlabeled n-grams feature vectors. In our work, we train five machine learning algorithms, namely SVM [39] , RF [40] , Adaboost [41] , Naive Bayes (NB) [42] , and KNN [43] . Finally, we validate the performance of these machine learning algorithms and select a better classifier as the classifier D.
SVM [39] is a machine learning algorithm based on VC Dimension theory and Structural Risk Minimization theory of statistical learning theory. Standard SVM is mainly used for 2-classification problems whose basic model is to find the best Separating Hyperplane in the feature space to maximize the interval between positive and negative samples on the training set. This paper belongs to the multiclassification problem, and applies one-against-all SVM. One-against-all SVM establishes N decision boundaries for N classifications, and each decision boundary determines the attribution of one classification to all other classifications. Meanwhile, all decision boundaries can be computed iteratively by modifying the optimization problem of standard SVM.
RF [40] is a machine learning algorithm that integrates multiple trees by ensemble learning, whose basic unit is a decision tree. Unlike decision tree algorithm, RF extracts training samples to train each tree by using Random Sampling With Replacement, and randomly select some features through the tree nodes. Then the results of several weak classifiers (trees) form a strong classifier via a voting mechanism. In RF, we can modify the number of decision tree, number of features to consider for each node, and maximum depth of the decision trees to improve the classifier.
Adaboost [41] is the most popular boosting algorithm in machine learning. The Adaboost classifiers use the weak classifiers as the base classifiers, assign different weight parameters based on the error rate of the classifier, and finally accumulate the weighted prediction results as the output. In our work, we chose the relatively simple NB classifiers based on NB algorithms as the base classifiers. Compared with RF, Adaboost uses an adaptive method to change the probability distribution and learns each base classifier iteratively. In each iteration, the data weights of the last wrong classification and the weights of the base classifier with smaller classification error rate are increased. Then the linear combination of the base classifiers is regarded as a strong classifier.
NB [42] is a machine learning algorithm based on Bayesian theorem and independent assumption of feature conditions. It calculates the probability that an unknown sample is correctly predicted as belonging to given family. Naive Bayes Classifier (NBC) requires few estimated parameters, is not sensitive to missing data, and is relatively simple. In theory, NBC has the smallest error rate compared with other classification methods. But in fact, the independent assumption of feature conditions is often not valid, which has a certain impact on the correct classification of NBC.
KNN [43] is a supervised and lazy learning algorithm in machine learning. The classifier in the KNN algorithm selects K nearest neighbors for the input data point in the training set, and classifies the data point according to the category which appears most frequently in K neighbors (Maximum Voting Rule). In KNN algorithm, the selected neighbors are all correctly classified samples. The classifier does not need to use training set for training, so it has less time complexity, and is especially suitable for multi-classification problems.
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, we evaluated the efficiency of our proposed system Malscore on a real and large data set. First, we described the experimental environment and the data set. Second, we defined evaluation criteria for Malscore. Third, we evaluated the performance of variable n-grams and fixed n-grams on different machine learning algorithms, and the effect of changes of PT in Phase 1 on the classification results. Fourth, we showed the experimental results and time costs for multi-classification. Finally, we showed the confusion matrix of malware classification and the comparison results with other similar methods.
A. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT AND DATA SET
The experimental data set for this paper was collected primarily through the VX Heaven website [44] , which contains 271,092 tagged malware samples. There were two criteria for dataset selection used in this paper. One was that the number of samples in malware family cannot be too low, because we use deep learning. The other was all malware samples belong to Win32 platform. Before data processing, we didn't delete any samples in selected data set, and used all native malware as our data set to reduce the impact of human factors on classification results. So we chose 174,607 real and effective malware samples from 63 families. All experiments were performed on a laptop of Windows 10 v1809 operating system with Inter(R) Core i7-7700 @3.6G Hz CPU, 16G RAM and DDR4. In our experiments, the training set contained 139,687 samples and the test set contained 34,920 samples. And because our data set size was enough, our experimental data set was fixed instead of cross validation. The number of samples is shown in Table 4 .
B. EVALUATION CRITERIA
We evaluated the classification performance of Malscore using Precision, Recall, F1−score, and Accuracy. The four evaluation criteria are calculated as:
Accuracy = correctly classified samples total number of samples (10) Whereby, the true positive (TP) is the number of samples belonging to the family k that are correctly labeled as family k; the false positive (FP) is the number of samples not belonging to the family k that are erroneously labeled as family k; the false negative (FN) is the number of samples belonging to the family k that are erroneously labeled as other family.
C. EVALUATION OF N-GRAMS AND MACHINE LEARNING
We experimentally compared the influence of variable n−grams(n = 2, 3, 4) with fixed n-grams on the classification results. Meanwhile, we also compared the influence of the five machine learning algorithms mentioned in Section V-C on the classification results. The results are shown in Figure 7 . Figures 7(a) to 7(e) show the variation trend of the Accuracy of 2−grams, 3−grams, 4−grams, and n−grams(n = 2, 3, 4) with increasing number of features in different machine learning algorithms. These machine learning algorithms include SVM, RF, Adaboost, NB, and KNN.
In Figure 7 (a), the Accuracy of the classifier with 3−grams is better than that of the other classifiers when the number of features is lower than 12. However, the Accuracy of the classifier with n-grams rises rapidly and exceeds the classifier with 3−grams when the number of features is greater than 12. When the number of features is equal to 16, the Accuracy of the classifier with n-grams is 97.55% and tends to be stable, which is 2.36% to 5.27% higher than that of the other classifiers.
Figures 7(b) and 7(c) illustrate similar growth trends for the Accuracy of the all classifiers with increasing number of feature in the RF algorithms and Adaboost algorithms. When the number of features is greater than 13, the Accuracy of the classifier with n-grams is 97.73% and 97.74%, respectively, which is significantly better than that of the other classifiers.
In Figure 7(d) , clearly, the Accuracy of all classifiers in the NB algorithm is not good, regardless of the number of feature. The Accuracy is not stable until the number of features is equal to 20. The best Accuracy of all classifiers is no more than 80%. The Accuracy of classifiers with 2−grams, 3−grams, 4−grams and n-grams ranges from 41.21% to 79.69%.
From Figure 7 (e), the classifiers with 2−grams and 3−grams are more accurate than 4−grams and n-grams when the number of features is lower than 10. The Accuracy of all classifier tends to be stable when the number of features is between 11 and 13, and the Accuracy of the classifier with n-grams is 87.14%.
From Figures 7(a) to 7(e), Although the Accuracy of the classifier with n-grams is lower than that of the other classifier when the number of features is small, the Accuracy of the classifier with n-grams is better than that of the other classifier when the Accuracy tends to be stable. As the number of features increases, the more the number of n-grams features, the more representative the semantic information of malware.
As we can see from Figure 7 , the Accuracy of the classifier with n−grams(n = 2, 3, 4) is better than that of the other classifiers when the Accuracy of the classifier with n−grams (n = 2, 3, 4) tends to be stable. Therefore, we compare the classification performance of the classifier with n−grams(n = 2, 3, 4) using different machine learning algorithm in our selected data sets in Malscore. Table 2 shows the performance of Phase 2 in Malscore compared with the methods using different machine learning algorithm and [45] using deep learning on the malware dataset. Zhao et al. [45] with CNN can be compared with our experiments. The Phase 2 in Malscore outperforms almost other techniques when it comes to classifying malware, that is, Accuracy = 97.73%. This superior performance is seen for Precision, Recall and F1−score as well. Figure 7 (f) compares the Accuracy of the classifier with n-grams in different machine learning algorithms. From Figure 7 (f) and Table 2 , the Accuracy of the classifiers in RF and Adaboost algorithm is highest while that of the classifiers in NB algorithm is lowest. Although the Accuracy of the classifier in SVM algorithm is similar to RF and Adaboost algorithm, the Accuracy of the classifier in SVM algorithm cannot reach stability until the number of features is equal to 16 .
To further verify performance of the classifiers in RF and Adaboost algorithms, we analyzed the time cost of both. The comparison results are shown in Table 3 . From Table 3 , the training and testing time of the classifier in Adaboost algorithm are 31.63% and 34.78% longer than that of the classifier in RF algorithm while the Accuracy is only 0.01% higher than that in RF algorithm. Therefore, we chose the classifier in RF algorithm as classifier D.
D. EVALUATION OF PROBABILITY THRESHOLD IN PHASE 1
In order to maximize classification advantage of Phase 1 and Phase 2, the PT was used to concatenate trained classifier S based CNN algorithm and classifier D based RF algorithm. A suitable PT can not only improve the Accuracy of the classification, but also minimize the time cost of Malscore. Figure 8 shows the trend of the number of samples inputted into the Phase 2 and the classification Accuracy as the PT increases. From Figure 8 , the number of samples inputted into the Phase 2 is small, and the Accuracy of the Malscore is similar to the Accuracy of the classifier S (the green dot in Figure 8 represents the Accuracy of the classifier S) when the PT is lower than 0.4. So the dynamic analysis in Phase 2 will be meaningless, because most malware can be filtered. When the PT is greater than 0.89, as the number of samples inputted into the Phase 2 increases, the classification performance of the Phase 1 becomes weaker. We needed to determine PT by weighing classification accuracy and time cost. These malware samples with low credibility (possibly classified correctly, possibly incorrectly) in Phase 1 were further submitted to Phase 2 for analysis and judgment by the PT. And the suitable PT will bring the advantages of phase 1 (static analysis) and phase 2 (dynamic analysis) into full play.
As a result, the classification Accuracy of Malscore was only 0.14% higher than that of the classifier D (the red dot in Figure 8 represents the Accuracy of the classifier D). In Figure 8 , the Accuracy of Malscore tends to be stable when the PT is between 0.79 and 0.89. When the number of samples inputted into the Phase 2 increases from 8,128 to 17,878, the Accuracy increases only from 98.77% to 98.89%. According to Figure 8 , we chose PT = 0.84. When PT = 0.84, the classification accuracy of Malscore can achieve 98.82% while minimizing the number of samples submitted to Phase 2. When Malscore classified malware, PT was fixed as Malscore's system parameter. 
E. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS FOR MULTI-CLASSIFICATION
According to the evaluation in Sections VI-C and VI-D, Malscore set the probability threshold in Phase 1 is 0.84 and the machine learning algorithm in Phase 2 uses the RF algorithm. We verified the classifier S, the classifier D, the ensemble learning (both the classifier S and the classifier D) and the Malscore, and the verification results are shown in Table 4 . From Table 4 , the classifier D is better in some families than the classifier S, for example, the 18th family and the 22nd family. The classification accuracy of Malscore is 98.82%, which is higher than that of classifier S and classifier D, and is similar to ensemble learning. Figures 9 and 10 show the FPR and FNR of Phase 1 and Malscore. As shown in Figures 9 and 10 , Malscore has lower FPR and FNR than Phase 1 (Static Analysis), and FPR and FNR are 0% in 52 families. Because the dataset contained some malware samples using packing/encryption technology, which makes static analysis difficult. Malscore used dynamic analysis to compensate for shortcomings of static analysis, so that the classification system can recognize these samples. However, from Figures 9 and 10 , Malscore cannot eliminate FPR/FNR. There were two main reasons. (1) To avoid the detection of dynamic analysis, some malware may detect the execution environment. If virtual machine environment is detected, these malware will resist running. Then, dynamic analysis still has a problem that it cannot traversed all execution paths. When malicious execution path(s) cannot be triggered, malware will be judged as ''benign''. (2) The threshold (probability scoring) we set was to minimize FPR/FNR of phase 1 (static analysis) in Malscore, and cannot guarantee that classification accuracy of Phase 1 was absolutely 100%. Even though FPR/FNR of Phase 1 was lower, it will still make a ''contribution'' to Malscore's FPR/FNR.
While Malscore reduced FPR/FNR, the decision whether or not to omit the costly dynamic analysis depending on a probability (credibility of static analysis results) for every malware sample can help us solve the problem of costly dynamic analysis. Combining with the classification results in Table 4 , it is found that the recall of packed malware samples in Phase 1 is lower than Malscore. Tables 5 and 6 show the time cost of classifier S and classifier D. From Tables 5 and 6 , generation of grayscale images and extraction of n-grams features account for more than 99% of the time cost in the total learning process. The classifier D belonged to the dynamic analysis so that it was also much more time cost than the classifier S belonging to the static analysis. At the same time, Tables 5 and 6 also show some interesting information. For example, the test time of the classifier in RF algorithm is more than that of the classifier in CNN algorithm, but the training time is less. Tables 7 and 8 show the time cost of the ensemble learning and the Malscore. This ensemble learning algorithm used ensemble learning idea to integrate Phase 1 and Phase 2, and was used to compare with Malscore to illustrate the advantages of Malscore. Ensemble learning was used to identify malware by integrating the results of multiple component learners (Different types of individual learners), thereby improving the final accuracy and reducing the FPR. We used the idea of bagging [46] to construct ensemble learning method, and bagging uses the playback sampling to select the training dataset of each learner, which can not only ensure that the trained learners are different, but also ensure the classification performance of component learners. In this paper, we trained two component learners h S and h D , h S was classifier S based on CNN algorithm and h D was classifier D based on RF algorithm. For each malware x, a label c j was predicted by the learners from label set {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c j , . . . , c 63 }, and we used plurality voting as a combination strategy. We represented the predicted output of h S and h D on sample x as two 63-dimensional vector (h 1
F. CALCULATION OF TIME COST
, where h j is a class probability representing the output of learners on the class label c j . Equation 11 can calculate the voting result H (x), which is the predictive label c j of malware sample x. (11) H (x) is the highest vote label. If there are multiple labels with the highest vote, one of them will be selected randomly as the label of sample x. Table 7 shows the time cost of the total training and testing phase, and Table 8 shows the sample average of the time cost. From Tables 7 and 8 , compared with the ensemble learning in testing, the preprocessing and test time of Malscore represent a reduction of 59.58% and 61.70%, respectively, when the VOLUME 7, 2019 Accuracy represents a reduction of 0.09%. Because the probability threshold of Phase 1 was set to 0.84 in Section VI-D, the number of samples inputted into Phase 2 was only 13,087, which was 21,833 less than the number of samples in the Classifier D, thus the time cost in testing was reduced.
After analysis in subsections VI-E and VI-F, Malscore's classification performance was better than static analysis, dynamic analysis and ensemble learning in terms of cost-accuracy tradeoff. With the maturity of malware technology, more and more problems will bring troubles to detection methods, such as traversing execution paths, concept drift [16] , and obfuscated system calls [27] , [28] . Malscore was only starting, and needed further optimization in future research work to deal with various detection difficulties. Figure 11 shows the Confusion Matrix of the 63 families in the experiments. The ID of each malware family is shown in Table 4 . Each column of the Confusion Matrix represents the predicted classification of the sample, and each row represents the real classification of the sample. It is evident from Figure 11 that the Malscore has the best classification capability for 52 families, in which families, the Accuracy can achieve 100%.
G. CONFUSION MATRIX

H. COMPARISON WITH OTHER SIMILAR METHODS
The Accuracy and classification cost of malware classification are the key to identifying malware classification methods. By probability scoring and machine learning, the Accuracy of malware classification of Malscore reached 98.82%. Firstly, Malscore fused CNN network and RF algorithm results by concatenating ensemble. Concretely, concatenating ensemble combined two phases (CNN discriminant result and RF discriminant result) to train a malware classifier. Table 9 provides more inside into Malscore. Table 9 shows Malscore yields much better performance compared with Phase 1 or Phase 2 only.
Then we compared Malscore with other similar classification methods. Figures 12 and 13 provide a comparison result. Figure 12 shows the Accuracy and number of malware of other similar classification methods, including static ensemble learning with grayscale images and opcode sequence [10] , [12] , static and dynamic analysis with API calls or opcode sequence [29] , [31] , only static analysis with grayscale images or API calls [11] , [20] , and only dynamic analysis with FCG or registry [47] , [48] . From Figure 12 , the accuracy of methods 5 and 6 is slightly higher than that of Malscore. By making analysis the articles of methods 5 and 6 in depth, we found that the data sets of these two methods are too small to cover the features contained in the malware family as much as possible, and the samples selected from each malware family have relatively high similarity. Moreover, method 5 uses a traditional graph distance similarity algorithm that can take more time cost, and method 6 is vulnerable to packing or obfuscation techniques. In order to make up the problems of methods 5 and 6, Malscore concatenated static analysis (deep learning) and dynamic analysis (machine learning) to classify malware. Although our accuracy was theoretically lower than methods 5 and 6, it can be seen from Table 10 that Malscore has a better accuracycost tradeoff in the same dataset. Although method 5 is 0.29% higher than Malscore, method 5 costed an average of 53.72ms to detect a malware sample while Malscore only costed 0.04ms. For our testing set (34,920 samples), method 5 costed about 31.27 minutes, while Malscore only costed 1.25s. For millions of malware, the detection time of method 5 took days to complete. Method 6 had the advantage of static analysis, and the preprocessing time and testing time were lower than Malscore, but the accuracy of method 6 on our testing set was only 90.45%, not 98.88% mentioned in the original article. This is because our testing set contains about 2,500 packed/encrypted malware, and static analysis cannot extract such malware features. The accuracy of method 6 also decreased with the increase of packed malware, which is the limitation of static analysis. The average preprocessing time and testing time of Malscore were only 0.95s and 0.02ms more than the static analysis method 6, but 2.25s and 0.05ms less than ensemble learning. As shown in Table 10 , Malscore is better in the accuracy-cost tradeoff. Malscore not only had the ability to handle packed malware, but it also had lower time cost. In practice, Malscore focused on static analysis and supplements dynamic analysis. In Table 10 , Malscore's average time cost is 1.6s. In fact, 1.6s is the average cost of static analysis and dynamic analysis. Because of the high cost of dynamic analysis, the average value is higher. We deployed Malscore on our server. In our dataset, about 75% of the malware was an average of 185ms instead of 1.6s.
In Figure 12 , we compared Malscore-like classification methods from the perspective of dynamic analysis and static analysis. Besides these eight malware classification methods in Figure 12 , we further compared Malscore-like classification methods from the perspective of machine learning and deep learning. As shown in Figure 13 , we classified the classification methods into three categories. The first is that grayscale images and API sequences are learned by learning algorithms different from CNN and RF [6] , [15] , [45] , [49] , [50] . The second is that malware features different from gray image and API sequence are learned by CNN and RF algorithms [51] - [53] . The last is that learning algorithms and malware features different from those of Malscore [23] , [54] - [57] . From Figure 13 , (1) Compared with other machine learning or deep learning algorithms, the CNN and RF algorithms in Malscore had better classification performance when learning grayscale images and API sequences. (2) Compared with other malware features, the grayscale images and API sequences proposed in Malscore can be better learned in CNN algorithm and RF algorithms. (3) The Malscore had better classification performance both in feature selection and classification algorithm selection.
In Figure 13 , Method 1 represents the Malscore; Methods 2 to 4 learn grayscale images using RF, Artificial Neural Network and ensemble learning algorithms, respectively; Methods 5 and 6 learns API sequences using RNN and CNN algorithms, respectively; Method 7 learns Local binary pattern features of grayscale images using CNN algorithm; Methods 8 and 9 learn self-organizing feature maps and opcode using RF algorithm, respectively; Method 10 learns system call sequence using a neural network based on convolutional and recurrent network layers; Method 11 learns image from opcode using SVM algorithm; Method 12 learns malware feature maps generated by using deep autoencoder using transfer-deep convolutional generation adversarial networks; Method 13 learns metadata, input functions and opcode of PE files by combining CNN algorithm with feed-forward Neural Network algorithm; Method 14 learns machine activity data by using RNN algorithm. The captured metrics of active data are: system CPU usage, user CPU use, packet send, packets received, et al.
VII. LIMITATIONS
In this paper, Malscore used probabilistic scoring to concatenate static analysis and dynamic analysis. Because of the high cost of dynamic analysis, Malscore didn't use dynamic analysis as the main detection method, but used dynamic analysis as a complementary method of static analysis for the robustness of packed/obfuscated malware. Therefore, Malscore's detection cost was lower than that of dynamic analysis, and its detection accuracy was higher than that of static analysis and dynamic analysis.
Over time, the performance of malware detection methods will naturally degrade with the appearance of concept drift problems [16] . Malscore doesn't take into account concept drift, and we don't provide any incremental learning strategies to fortify Malscore's re-learning ability. At the same time, with the development of malware detection methods, more and more malware producers use a variety of technologies to resist dynamic and static analysis. For example, these producers obfuscate not only raw malware, but also system calls of malware in dynamic analysis. This kind of malware will make our static analysis and dynamic analysis lose ''eye''. Therefore, Malscore also lacks the ability to detect such malware.
Although Malscore has achieved some success in malware detection, there are still some areas for improvement. Our future work on Malscore will focus on the following: 1) Although concept drift is a well-known and troublesome thing in machine learning, we can use MaMaDroid [58] - [60] and incremental learning algorithms to reduce the impact of concept drift on Malscore. In this environment, additional experiments are needed to evaluate the impact of concept drift on Malscore. 2) Although dynamic analysis of obfuscation features is a problem, recently some methods have been proposed to solve this problem [27] , [28] . We hope to enhance the robustness of dynamic analysis in Malscore, not only as a supplement to static analysis, but also as a major contribution to Malscore detection.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the main goal was to present a system Malscore for malware classification, which was based on probability scoring and machine learning. In the Malscore, the convolutional neural networks with Spatial Pyramid Pooling was used to analyze grayscale image (static feature) in Phase 1, and the variable n-grams and machine learning were used to analyze native API call sequence (dynamic features) in Phase 2. To concatenate Phase 1 and Phase 2, a probability scoring was proposed to identify the credibility of the classification results in Phase 1, and Phase 2 further analyzed these malware with lower credibility. We performed experiments on 174,607 malware samples from 63 malware families. The result showed Malscore achieved 98.82% accuracy for malware classification, and the recall and precision of 100% in 52 families. Compared with the ensemble learning in testing, the preprocessing and test time of Malscore represented a reduction of 59.58% and 61.70%, respectively. This showed that the Malscore had a lower time cost. Malscore took only 0.04ms to detect a packed malware sample and 0.001ms to detect a unpacked malware sample in an operating system with 16G RAM and 3.6G CPU. Through this system, not only the performance of static analysis for static classification is utilized, but also the universality of dynamic analysis for packing and obfuscation techniques is fully utilized.
